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VICTORIA UNIVERSITY or: WELLINGTON 
ABSTRACT 
The following paper is concerned with the appointment of the judiciary in New 
Zealand. 
This paper is intended to give an overview of the current appointment process 
and identify the key criteria of any appointment system. It then compares the 
current appointment process with those key criteria in order to establish whether 
or not the current process is in need of reform. The necessary conclusion is that 
some level of reform is required. 
The second objective of this paper is to decide whether the establishment of a 
Judicial Appointments Commission is a justifiable response to the current need 
for reform. This question is assessed by considering whether the introduction of a 
Commission would result in an appointment system that better satisfies the key 
criteria identified in this paper. Ultimately, this paper concludes that a Judicial 
Appointments Commission is not justifiable in the New Zealand context. 
STATEMENT ON WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents and footnotes) 
comprises approximately 12,447 words. 
Public Law -Appointment of Judges. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the chief expositors, applicators and developers of the law it can hardly be 
disputed that judges are important constitutional actors. Therefore, it is important 
to ensure that the process by which they are appointed will produce a judiciary 
that is of the highest possible quality and able to act with absolute integrity. 
This paper discusses the problems associated with our current appointment 
process and asks whether the creation of an independent Judicial Appointments 
Commission would be a better means of appointing the custodians of the rule of 
law. 
The first part of this paper describes the existing appointment process in New 
Zealand and sets out the key criteria for a successful appointment regime. 
Our process has been criticised for failures in relation to each of these key 
criteria. Part two discusses those criticisms and concludes that the current system 
has a number of inherent short-comings, and that some level of reform is 
justified. 
A Judicial Appointments Commission has often been suggested as a potential 
alternative to the cunent process. The third part of this paper identifies and 
discusses the various models that have been suggested for such a Commission. 
Finally, part four considers whether the establishment of a Judicial Appointments 
Commission would constitute an improvement over the current appointment 
process. To that end the various models are assessed in terms of their likely 
impact on the key aspects of any appointment system if they were to replace the 
present system. 
Ultimately, this paper concludes that, while an Appointments Commission would 
address some of the cunent concerns, it would also create a number of new 
2 
problems and would not result in an appointment process that better conforms 
with the key criteria identified in this paper. Therefore, this paper is of the 
opinion that while the present system is in need of reform, its replacement by a 
Judicial Appointments Commission is not a viable alternative. 
PART 1: PORTRAIT OF AN APPOINTMENT SYSTEM 
Part one of this paper describes the existing appointment process m New 
Zealand. It also identifies the key criteria for a successful appointment regime. 
I THE EXISTING PROCESS 
The current procedures for judicial appointment came into effect in 1999, 
following revision of the process by successive Attorney-Generals.' The changes 
were designed to standardise the appointment process, with administrative 
matters managed by the Judicial Appointments Unit in the Department of Justice. 
Section 4(2) of the Judicature Act 1908 provides the rather bare statement that 
judges are to be appointed by the Governor-General. In practice, appointment is 
made by the Governor-General acting upon the advice of the Attorney-General 
after a relatively informal process of consultation and discussion has taken place. 
The current process of appointment has evolved over time and is largely a matter 
of convention.2 
A Criteria for Appointment 
CuITently section 6 of the Judicature Act specifies that no person shall be 
appointed a High Court judge unless they have held a practicing certificate as a 
barrister or solicitor for at least seven years. This is the limit of legislative 
qualifications.3 However, as part of the formalisation process a set of specific 
1 Philip Joseph Co11stitutio11al and Adlllinistrative Law in Ne 111 Zealand (2nd edition, Brooker' s, 
Wellington, 2001) 255 . 
2 Ministry of Justice Appointing Judg es: a Judicial Appointlllents Collllllissionfor New Zealand? 
(Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 200-t) 18. 
3 David Williams QC "The Judicial Appointment Process" (2004] NZ Law Rev 39, 43. 
3 
criteria for appointment has been established by the Attorney-General to aid the 
objective assessment of the most suitable candidates. These are a list of "clearly 
defined, transparent and publicly announced criteria" that are currently used in 
assessing candidates for judicial office.
4 The listed criteria are legal ability, 
qualities of character, personal technical skills and reflection of society. 
B The Consultation Process 
Consultation as to potential candidates is fairly widespread. The Judicial 
Appointments Unit advertises for nominations or expressions of interest, 
consulting with organisations such as the New Zealand Law Society, New 
Zealand Bar Association, Maori Law Society, the President of the Law 
Commission and others. All names that meet the criteria are pooled and held by 
the Judicial Appointments Unit on a confidential database.
5 For appointments to 
the High Court the candidates undergo a short-listing process managed by the 
Chief Justice and the President of the Court of Appeal, with assistance from the 
Solicitor-General if necessary.
6 When a vacancy occurs further consultation is 
undertaken and several names are submitted to the Attorney-General, from which 
he or she chooses the prefeITed candidate. 
A similar process is undertaken for appointments to the District Court, except 
that the process is managed by the Department of Justice and not the Solicitor-
General. Also, a series of interviews are conducted in relation to particular 
District Court vacancies.
7 
Unlike the High Court and District Court, advertising is not undertaken for 
appointments to the Court of Appeal. This is because appointments to the Court 
of Appeal are generally made through the elevation of existing High Court 
Judges. 8 
4 "Judicial Appointments: Office of High Court Judge" available on-line at 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/other/pamphlets/2003/. 
5 David Williams QC, above n 3, 45. 
6 Ministry of Justice, above n 2, 19. 
7 Ministry of Justice, above n 2, 20. 
8 Ministry of Justice, above n 2, 21. 
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The Supreme Court is a recent addition to New Zealand's legal framework, 
however, it is expected that most appointments to the Supreme Court will come 
from the Court of Appeal or the High Court.
9 
II THE KEY REQUIREMENTS OF ANY JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT 
SYSTEM 
A recent Ministry of Justice discussion paper on the appointment of judges 
identified the following criteria as the key hallmarks of any judicial appointment 
system. 
1) The appointments must be made on the basis of merit; 
2) Public confidence must be maintained in the process, the courts and the 
judiciary; 
3) The result should be a judiciary which is both capable of independent, 
impartial and competent decision- making, and reflective of the society it 
serves; and 
4) The process should avoid inappropriate politicisation. 
10 
In essence there are three essential elements of a sound appointment system. It 
should result in the best available candidates being appointed in a manner that is 
free from political interference or bias and which maintains public confidence in 
the judiciary.
11 
9 Ministry of Justice, above n 2, 21. 
10 Ministry of Justice, above n 2, I I. 
11 David Williams QC, above n 3, 47. 
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PART 2: CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
Our current appointment system has been widely criticised in recent years. This 
part describes and details those criticisms. 
Criticism of the current process may be split into three broad categories . These 
categories reflect the three key hallmarks of a good appointment system 
identified by this paper. 
I POTENTIAL POLITICISISA TION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
One of the underlying objecti ves of the any appointment system is to preserve 
judicial independence and avoid a politicised judiciary. Critics of the current 
system argue that it lacks the necessary constitutional safeguards to ensure that 
the appointment of judges are not, and will not, be politically motivated. 
A Protection from Political Interference in the Current System 
Under the current appointment system judicial independence is intended to be 
preserved by the 
"cardinal convention" that judicial appo intme nts are never based on politi ca l 
influences. This is no twithstanding the fact that the Attorney-General is a member of 
Parliament, usually a me mber o f Cabinet, as we ll as ho lding other ministerial 
portfolios. 
In addition, as judicial appointments are not to be politically motivated they are 
not subject to discussion by the Cabinet. Instead, the Attorney-General merely 
announces the appointment to Cabinet, foll owed by formal advice to the 
Governor-General. As such, the Attorney-General is acting in their capacity as 
first law officer of the Crown, and not as a Cabinet Minister. Indeed, the fact that 
the Attorney-General is politically appointed is intended to provide a means of 
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accountability for his or her actions and act as a democratic check against 
political appointments. 
B Criticism of This Protection 
The obvious disadvantage of this system, identified by the 1978 Royal 
Commission on the Courts, is the lack of any constitutional safeguards that might 
prevent the influence of political favouritism in the appointment process. As the 
Commission noted, it is
12 
only when a judge is appo inted [that] the prov isions in respect of tenure of office, 
removal and fixing of sa laries give statutory recog niti on to the principle o f 
independence so that the re is, at least in theoretica l terms, scope fo r po litical inOuence 
in the making o f judic ia l appo intments. 
More recently such criticism has been echoed by Sir Thomas Eichelbaum who 
noted that it is important to recognise that the current system is merely resting on 
convention. He highlights the fact that "Like it or not - like them or not - in a 
democracy the judges are a bulwark between individual rights and the power of 
the Executive." 1
3 
However, a strong argument against such critici sm is that New Zealand does not 
have a history of political appointments and that thi s is evidence that the risk of a 
politicised judiciary is more theoretical than a genuine concern. Sir Thomas 
Eichelbaum has noted that he is unaware of any exa mple in New Zealand history 
where an appointment has been criticised as politically motivated, 
14 and Paul 
East has stated that the current system has provided us with "a judiciary that is 
respected throughout the world for its absolute integrity" .
15 
12 Report of the Royal Commissw11 0 11 rhe Courrs ( 1978) 200. 
13 Sir Thomas Eichelbaum "Judicial Independence - Fact or Fiction?" [ 1993] NZLJ 90 90. 
14 Sir Thomas Eichelbaum, above n 13, 92. 
15 Hon Paul East, Attorney-General , "The Role o f the Attorney-General" in Philip Joseph (ed) 
Essays on the Consritutio11 (Brooker's, Wellington, 1995) 184, 202. 
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1 Politically motivated appointments 
While the statements of Sir Thomas Eichelbaum and Paul East are generally true, 
judicial appointments in New Zealand are not without examples of historical 
abuse. 
The appointment of Sir Robert Stout as Chief Justice in 1899 was regarded as a 
means of removing him from the political arena.
16 There is also the example of 
the Atkinson Administration appointing WB Edwards as a High Court judge 
apparently in return for his agreement to chair a commission on Maori Land 
issues. The next Administration attacked his appointment as invalid. The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal upheld his appointment but the Privy Council reversed 
that decision. 17 Edwards J was forced to return to practice, although he was 
subsequently reappointed to the High Court bench.
18 In modern times both his 
return to practice and reappointment would be controversial. 
Although isolated (and rather old) these examples demonstrate that political 
appointments are a very real danger in the absence of proper constitutional 
safeguards. In addition, recent changes m both the political and social 
environment have increased the risk of politically motivated judicial 
appointments. 
C Recent Developments 
In a 1995 article the then Attorney-General Paul East noted that recent changes in 
the practice of law had lead to an increased concern about the role of the 
judiciary in an increasingly complex and stressed society.
19 
16 Robin Cooke Portrait of a Profession; the Centennial Book of the New Zealand Law Society 
(Reed, Auckland, 1969) 55. 
17 Buckley v Edwards (1892) ZPCC 204. 
18 Lord Cooke, above n 16, 55-56. 
19 Hon Paul East, Attorney-General "A Judicial Commission" [1995] NZLJ 189, 189. 
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1 The growth of judicial review. 
The Attorney-General felt that 
perhaps the biggest change is the growth of judicial review . ... decisions in relation to 
administrative review have increasingly placed Judges ever closer to making decisions 
about administrative deci sion making itself. 
In recent years courts have shown an increasing willingness to substitute their 
own decisions for those of the executive. Such an approach can be seen in the 
case of Waikato Regional Airport v Attorney-General.
20 The case was concerned 
with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries' border control services. Regional 
airports were being charged for the services while Crown funding was used 
exclusively to fund the services for metropolitan airports. Waikato Airport 
brought an action in judicial review in relation to this charging system. 
In the High Court Wild J held that the charging decisions were invalid as they 
had taken into account in-elevant considerations.21 Wild J instructed both parties 
to decide on an equitable refund between themselves. If they could not do so his 
Honour held that he would dete1111ine an appropriate refund, and that his 
approach would be along the following lines?~ 
In each financial year, to allocate the available Parliamentary appropriation to each 
international airport pro rata to the number of incoming international passengers and 
tonnage of incoming international freight requiring border control services that that 
airport handled. 
In effect the Court would impose what it felt was a fair distribution of the border 
control costs, a decision that the courts have traditionally regarded as the 
exclusive preserve of the executive. Traditionally the decision would be quashed, 
20 Waikato Regional Airport v Attorney-General (200 I] 2 ZLR 670. 
21 Waikato Airport v Attomey-Cenera/ above n 20, 702-703. 
22 Waikato Airport v Attomey-Ceneral above n 20, 716. 
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the charges refunded in full and the decision left to the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries to make again, with due consideration of the relevant factors. 
This increased willingness of the courts to substitute their decision for those of 
the executive has placed them closer to the decision making process. If this 
continues the temptation for the executive to appoint judges who are sympathetic 
to their policy decisions will increase accordingly. 
However, the increasing scope of judicial review is not the only reason the risk of 
political appointments has increased. The recent introduction of the Supreme 
Court could be seen as creating further incentives for political appointments to 
the judiciary. 
2 The introduction of the Supreme Court 
It has been argued that the establishment of a Supreme Court, in place of the 
Privy Council, has served to underscore and increase the importance of ensuring 
that judges are appointed in a manner that ensures their political independence.
23 
The prospect of appointment by a single political party of the entire highest court 
of appeal raised widespread public concern.
24 Editorials in the New Zealand 
Herald and Sunday Star Times were concerned that the new court would be 
stacked "with Labour favourites and judicial activists."
25 
The notion that the Supreme Court has increased the risk of political 
appointments is consistent with the ACT submission on the Supreme Court Bill. 
The submission argued that when there was a superior court outside New 
Zealand it was not worth incuning the political cost of stacking the Court. This 
was because judges appointed to New Zealand courts were not our highest 
23 David Williams QC, above n 3, 41. 
24 "80 pc want a say on new court - poll", NelV Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 14 
October 2003. 
25 "Stop this stunning abuse of power", New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 9 October 
2003, "Privy Council stance masks the real issue", New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 
14 October 2003. 
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judicial authority and as such were unable to "develop" the law in a particular, 
politically favoured direction .
26 
Ultimately, the argument that the Supreme Court will encourage political 
appointments is not persuasive. The vast majority of legal development occurs at 
the High Court and Court of Appeal level and not at the Privy Council/Supreme 
Court. Therefore, the trade-off between political cost and legal direction of 
political appointments is unlikely to have been changed in any meaningful way 
by the creation of the Supreme Court. 
In addition, the concern expressed by the public and media of political 
appointments to the new court appears to have focused on the appointed of an 
entire bench by one government rather than on singular appointments. As this is a 
one-off event, it cannot be used as evidence that the current appointment process 
is vulnerable to political appointments. 
3 Other developments 
There have been three other recent developments that have brought the judiciary 
ever closer to the realm of the executive. The first is the advent of Treaty of 
Waitangi jurisprudence. This has required New Zealand judges to enter into 
decision making processes reminiscent of constitutional adjudication in the 
United States.27 The second development was the passage of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, which has given judges a large number of generally 
stated principles to interpret and apply in respect of executive actions.
28 Finally, 
New Zealand is tending towards more generalised statutory provisions that 
provide the judiciary with more scope for interpretation than has been the case in 
the past.29 All three of these developments are bringing the judiciary closer to the 
26 Report from the Justice and Electornl Commiuee 011 1/ie Supreme Court Bill, 28. 
27 Sir Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand 's Co11s1iu11io11 in Crisis: Reforming Our Poli1ical System 
(Mcindoe, Dunedin, 1992) 99. 
28 Sir Geoffrey Palmer "Judicial Selection and Accountability: Can the New Zealand System 
Survive?" in BD Gray and RB McClintock (eds) Courts and Policy (Brooker's, Wellington, 
1995) 11, 21. 
29 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above n 28, 20. 
l l 
executive in terms of decision making and thereby increasing the risk of political 
appointments. 
D Summary of Politicisation 
The current system has long been criticised for a lack of constitutional safeguards 
that might prevent the influence of political favouritism in the appointment 
process. 
While the system has generally produced a judicial system that is respected 
around the world as capable and impartial, politically motivated appointments 
have occurred in the past. In addition, the growth of judicial review proceedings 
has increasingly placed the courts closer to the executive in terms of policy and 
decision malang. This incursion by the judiciary in areas that have traditionally 
been the sole preserve of the executive has served to increase the potential for 
political appointments to the judiciary. 
In addition, the development of Treaty of Waitangi jurisprudence, the passage of 
the Bill of Rights Act and a trend towards more generalised legislation have also 
increased judicial activity in areas traditionally reserved for the executive. 
An argument has also been made that the introduction of the Supreme Court 
could encourage political appointments as the executive now has the ability to 
appoint judges to the bench of New Zealand's highest court. However, this 
argument fails to account for the fact that most legal doctrine is created by the 
High Court and Court of Appeal. As such, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court 
will increase the risk of politicising our judiciary. 
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II QUALITY OF APPOINTMENTS 
The second key hallmark of any appointment system is that it appoints the best 
available candidates to the bench. However, it has been suggested that our 
current system fails to accurately identify and secure the most meritorious 
candidates for judicial appointment. 
A A Lack of Information 
In order for the most meritorious candidate to be appointed to a particular 
vacancy all relevant information on the respective candidates must be available to 
those making the decision. However, the current system has been criticised for 
failing to provide adequate data on potential candidates and, as a result, failing to 
appoint the most appropriate candidates to the bench. 
This informational shortage was experienced by Sir Geoffrey Palmer during his 
term as Attorney General. He found that
30 
there is one serious practical problem ... with the judicial appointments process. It fell 
to my lot to make many judicial appointments both to the High Court and the District 
Court. It was difficult to secure adequate systemati c data on potential candidates. The 
"think of a name" theory of appointment is far from sati sfactory. 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer went on to note that in London the department of the Lord 
Chancellor kept files on many members of the bar. Those files recorded the cases 
they were in, comments on their performance, notes relating to temperament and 
any other information deemed to be relevant. Such a system does not exist in 
New Zealand to any meaningful extent.
31 
30 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above n 28, 46. 
31 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above n 28, 46. 
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B Other Process Problems 
The lack of a systematic database is not the only reason the current system has 
been criticised for failing to ensure the best candidates are appointed to a given 
vacancy. The process functions of search, short-listing, interview and referee 
checking have all been described as "fragmented, incoherent, poorly resourced 
and out of line with best practice in both the private and public sector."
32 
Two main factors have been identified as inhibiting the proper operation of these 
essential process function s. 
Firstly, there is a lack of coherence in the current process. This is because the 
Minister of Justice and the Attorney-General are not always the same person. 
They are not now and were not immediately prior to the current administration . 
Therefore, while the Judicial Appointments Unit is run by the Minster of Justice, 
the actual appointments are made by the Attorney-General. It would be a far more 
efficient system if all advice, consultation and record keeping were consolidated 
with one group of officials who reported to, and were held accountable by, one 
minister who was in charge of all judicial appointments.
33 
Secondly, it has been suggested that the Judicial Appointments Unit lacks the 
necessary resources to conduct its appointment functions in a manner that is 
conducive to appointing the most meritorious candidates to the bench.
34 
C Summary of Quality of Appointment Criticisms 
The current appointments sys tem has been criticised for failing , at a practical 
level, to accurately identify and secure the most meritorious candidates for 
judicial appointment. 
32 Chen Palmer and Partners "Judicial Administration Issues" Memorandum to Hon Margaret 
Wilson, Attorney-General, (2002) 14. 
33 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above 11 28, 47. 
34 Chen Palmer and Partners, above 11 32, 15. 
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This criticism is based primarily on the lack of an adequate systematic database 
on potential candidates. In the absence of such information it is impossible to 
appoint the best possible candidates on a regular basis. In addition, the Judicial 
Appointments Unit has been criticised for failing to follow best practices in 
relation to other important process functions such as search, interview and short-
listing. The two main reasons for these practical shortcomings have been 
identified as a lack of coherence and a poorly resourced appointments agency. 
III PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN APPOINTMENTS 
The third key hallmark of any judicial appointment system is that it must 
engender public confidence in those it ultimately appoints as members of the 
judiciary. Again , our current process has been attacked for failing to engender 
this confidence. 
A The Lack of a Representative Judiciary 
An obvious feature of the cunent appointment process is that it has produced a 
judiciary that is predominantly white, male and middle-class. 
35 The Select 
Committee Report on the Supreme Court Bill noted that a "common theme was 
that if the judiciary continues to be drawn from a narrow demographic group, 
public confidence is likely to be undermined."
36 
This is not to say that merit should not be the defining criteria of judicial 
appointments. However, the suggestion is that the current process has not 
produced a culturally diverse bench and that this may be to the detriment of the 
judiciary, and the perception of the judiciary by the public. 
This argument was well summarised by John McGrath QC, Solicitor General in a 
recent article in the New Zealand Law Journal. He notes that
37 
35 Jack Hodder "Judicial Appointments in New Zealand" [ 1974] NZU 80, 85. 
36 Justice and Electoral Commillee, above n 26, 32. 
37 John McGrath QC, Solicitor-General "Appointing the Judiciary" [ 1998] NZLJ 314,316. 
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Preservation of public confidence in both the quality and the impartiality of the 
judiciary is vital. There is clearly a risk of loss of confidence if the public doubts that 
merit is the basic contention for all judicial appointments. There is also, however, a 
risk of loss of confidence if the appointments system is seen as one that undervalues 
social awareness and the importance of working towards a goal of better representation 
of society in the courts. That is because the public recognises that the work of judges 
involves constant application of their perception of community standards. 
Therefore, it is arguable that the cu1Tent system, which has produced a bench 
dominated by white males , is in danger of alienating the public and eroding their 
confidence in the judicial system. 
B A Ltick of Transparency in the Process 
It is also argued that a representative judiciary is not enough, in itself, to 
engender public confidence. It is further argued that a reasonable public will not 
respect public institutions the make-up of which they do not understand. As 
President Havel recently observed
38 
I am deeply convinced that the clearer more transparent and comprehensible our legal 
system is to citizens, the greater our hope that it will be respected. 
Unfortunately John McGrath QC has concluded that
39 
Measured against thi s standard, the judicial appointments system for the High Court 
and Court of Appeal, is I have to say, not transparent. The key aspects are shrouded in 
mystery, which inevitably inhibits the community's ability to understand the process. 
The prospect of gaining an increased public respect for the process while these 
characteristics remain, is doubtful. 
The main reason the cun-ent system lacks transparency is that it is essentially a 
very discreet process. It is conducted under wraps by, or on behalf of. the 
Attorney-General. In addition there is minimal opportunity for those interested in 
38 "The State of the Republic" The New York Review, New York, United States of America, 5 
March 1988, 42-43. 
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a position to ensure that they are considered.
40 Despite the fact that a list of 
criteria for selecting judges has been recently released, the majority of the system 
remains shrouded from the general public and this is unlikely to engender public 
confidence in those it appoints . 
C Summary of Public Confidence Criticisms 
The current appointment process has been criticised for failing to engender the 
requisite public confidence in those it appoints. 
These criticisms may be split into two broad categories. First, the system has 
been criticised for failing to appoint a representative judiciary. The work of 
judges involves a constant application of their perception of community 
standards. If those judges are not seen as representative of society the general 
public is unlikely to believe that their perceptions are reflective of the community 
and this is unlikely to engender the necessary public confidence. 
The second argument put forward is that the system also lacks transparency. The 
majority of the selection process is carried out in secret by, or on behalf of, the 
Attorney-General. It is argued that the public will not respect a public institution 
the make-up of which they do not understand. 
PART 3: A JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION 
Given the reasonably extensive list of criticisms levelled at our current 
appointments system it is unsurprising that there has been a strong push for 
reform over the years. In particular, a Judicial Appointments Commission has 
received strong support as a possible alternative to the current regime. 
The possibility of a Judicial Appointments Commission in New Zealand has been 
raised several times in the past. 
39 John McGrath QC, above n 37, 3 16. 
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The 1978 report of the Royal Commission on the Courts recommended the 
establishment of a Judicial Commission with the power to recommend judicial 
appointments. The proposal lapsed due to a lack of support from the judiciary.
41 
Support for a Commission resurfaced in the 1990s, partly in response to similar 
discussions and initiatives taking place overseas but also in response to a lack of 
satisfaction with the existing process. These concerns were partly addressed by 
the reforms of 1998. 
42 
Most recently, the possibility of a Judicial Commission was raised in response to 
the Supreme Court debate. Many submissions on the Supreme Court Bill 
expressed concern about the appointment process, and insisted on the creation of 
an Appointments Commission before they would support the Bill.
43 
This part of my paper discusses the potential membership, appointment process 
and powers of any Judicial Appointments Commission established in New 
Zealand. 
I MEMBERSHIP 
There are two main models in relation to the membership of any Judicial 
Appointments Commission. They are generally referred to as the legal 
establishment model and the supplemented legal establishment model.
44 
A The Legal Establishment Model 
The legal establishment model , as the name suggests, advocates a membership 
that consists solely of members of the legal community. Such a model was 
40 John McGrath QC, above 11 37 , 3 16. 
41 Ministry of Justice, above 11 2, 29. 
42 Ministry of Justice, above 11 2, 30. 
43 Ministry of Justice, above n 2, 3 I. 
44 John McGrath QC, above 11 37 , 317. 
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recommended by the 1978 Royal Commission for the Courts and is currently 
endorsed by the New Zealand Law Society's Courts and Tribunals Committee.
45 
The Royal Commission's report recommended a Commission that consisted of 
the Chief Justice (Chair), High Court Judge, Chief District Court Judge, 
Solicitor-General, Secretary for Justice and two representatives of the legal 
profession.4
6 
B The Supplemented Legal Establishment Model 
The supplemented legal establishment model advocates the varying or 
supplementing of the legal establishment model by the addition of lay 
representatives appointed by the Attomey-General.
47 
II THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS 
The appointment process involves four phases, the initial phase, the formal 
interview, advice to the minister and appointment.
48 
The initial phase begins with the Minister advising the Commission of an 
upcoming vacancy and requesting that it begin the selection process. The 
Commission then advertises the position and sets out the criteria for appointment. 
A short-list is then prepared after a review of the applicants, referee checks, and 
"discrete soundings" at the bench and bar.
49 
Next, most Commissions require a formal interview with all short-listed 
applicants. Applicants are then further short-listed and rated.
50 
45 John McGrath QC, above 11 37, 317. 
46 Report of the Royal Commission 0 11 the Courts, above n 12, 196-198. 
47 John McGrath QC, above 11 37, 317 . 
48 Ministry of Justice, above 11 2, 27. 
49 Ministry of Justice, above 11 2, 27. 
50 Ministry of Justice, above n 2, 27. 
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The Commission is then required to provide advice to the Minister. That advice 
may consist of a single name or a small list. Where more than one name is 
supplied, the candidates may or may not be ranked_s, 
When the Minister receives the list they are usually able to accept, reject or ask 
the Commission to reconsider (depending on the powers given to the 
Commission). The Minister is not obliged to accept or select from the 
recommended names in the order that they are ranked.s
2 
In most jurisdictions where a Judicial Commission exists, appointments can be 
made only on the Commission's recommendation. Some Commissions (e.g. 
Israel and South Africa) make a recommendation directly to the Head of State. 
However, most provide their advice to the Attorney-General or Minister of 
Justice.s3 
III JUDICIAL COMMISSIONS AND THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT 
There are a variety of models for Judicial Appointments Commissions in respect 
of their power over appointments. The recent UK Consultation Paper on judicial 
appointments identified three possible models.s
4 
A Appointing Commissions 
An Appointing Commission is , constitutionally, the most different from the 
current process undertaken in New Zealand. An Appointing Commission directly 
advises the Governor-General on judicial appointments, completely 
circumventing the advisory role currently undertaken by the Attorney-General.ss 
In other words, the Commission has the final say on judicial appointment. 
51 Ministry of Justice, above n 2, 27. 
52 Ministry of Justice, above n 2, 27. 
53 Ministry of Justice, above n 2, 28. 
54 Department for Constitutional Affairs "Constitutional Reform: A New Way of Appomting 
Judges" CP 10/03 July 2003, paras 34-52. Available on-line al 
www.dca.gov.uk/consult/jacommiss ion . 
55 David Williams QC, above n 3, 63. 
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B Recommending Commissions 
In contrast, a Recommending Commission would take responsibility for the 
application , consultation, recommendation and administrative process of judicial 
appointments.56 However, those recommendations would then be passed on to 
the Attorney-General for a final decision on appointment. 
This model can be structured in a number of different ways. The Attorney-
General can be granted a wide discretion where a list of candidates is 
recommended to the Attorney-General , who is then free to appoint any individual 
on that list. If the Attorney-General did not wish to appoint any of the 
recommended names it would be possible for them to require the Commission to 
supply a new list of names . However, if a more limited discretion was granted, a 
single candidate or smaller list may be presented with clear rankings. The 
expectation would be that the Attorney-General appoint the highest ranking 
member of that list, although they would be free to appoint another member of 
the list or request the Commission to produce another list of names. 
C Hybrid Model 
In addition to the Appointing and Recommending Commission models, the 
United Kingdom Consultation Paper also mentioned the possibility of a hybrid 
model. Under the hybrid model the Commission would be an Appointing 
Commission for the majority of appointments. However, the Commission would 
act in a recommendaratory role for more senior positions, presumably 
appointments to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in the New Zealand 
context.
57 
56 David Williams QC, above n 3, 64. 
57 David Williams QC, above n 3, 65. 
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IV SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION 
MODELS 
Potential models for a Judicial Appointments Commission in New Zealand may 
be distinguished on two main grounds, membership and powers of appointment. 
The two main models in respect of membership are the legal establishment model 
and the supplemented legal establishment model. Under the legal establishment 
model the Commission would consi st entirely of members of the legal 
community. In contrast, under the supplemented legal establishment model the 
Commission would al so include a number of lay people to represent the 
community which the judge is required to serve. 
There are then three primary models that re late to the powers of appointment that 
would be granted to a Judicial Appointments Commission in New Zealand. An 
Appointing Commission would advi se the Governor-General directly and 
therefore remove the Attorney-Genera l from the process . However, a 
Recommending Commission would merely provide advice to the Attorney-
General who would ultimately refer hi s or her preferred candidate to the 
Governor-General for appointment. A Hybrid Commission has also been 
suggested with appointing powers for lower courts and recommendaratory 
powers in relation to the higher courts . 
PART4: IS A JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION THE 
ANSWER? 
Ultimately, this paper is intended to come to a conclusion as to whether a Judicial 
Appointments Commission is more desirable than the current process in the New 
Zealand context. 
In order to determine thi s question the va ri ous Commission models are assessed 
in terms of their likely impact on the k y vulues of any appointment process. I.e. 
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political neutrality, quality of appointments and maintaining public confidence in 
the judiciary. 
I POLITICAL NEUTRALITY 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, a common criticism of the current 
appointments process is that it lacks sufficient constitutional safeguards to 
protect the process and, by extension , the independence of the judiciary from 
political interference. Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether the 
establishment of a Judicial Appointments Commission would help address this 
concern. 
A The Argument for a Judicial Appointments Commission 
Those in favour of a Judicial Appointments Commission argue that it would 
reduce the role of the Attorney-General in the appointment process. In so doing 
the role of the executive is reduced, along with its ability to interfere in the 
appointment process. 
This argument is given the most weight when applied to the Appointing 
Commission model. Under this model the executive, in the form of the Attorney-
General, is removed from the process altogether as the Governor-General does 
not have a discretionary role in the appointment of judges. 
B The Argument Against a Judicial Appointments Commission 
1 Is there a genuine risk of politico/ interference ? 
The first point to note 1s that the argument in favour of a Commission is 
dependent upon an acceptance that the cunent process is genuinely in danger of 
becoming politicised. New Zealand does not, despite one or two exceptions, have 
a history of political appointments to the judiciary. Although recent 
developments have perhaps increased the ri sk of a politicised judiciary there is no 
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evidence to date that suggests any recent judicial appointments have been 
politically motivated. However, it is arguable that an independent judiciary is of 
such fundamental importance that the risk of political interference is enough to 
· f 58 warrant a review o our current process. 
2 A lack of accountability 
While the introduction of an Appointing Commission would reduce the role of 
the executive it would also create several constitutional difficulties.
59 
In New Zealand, accountability for appointments is achieved through the system 
of ministerial responsibility to Parliament. Appointments can be questioned 
debated and the Minister held accountable for his choice. The scope also exists 
for Select Committee examination of appointments. This has not occurred, 
presumably because appointments in recent years have not been open to 
question. 60 Therefore, as an elected member of the executive, the Attorney-
General is currently accountable to Parliament, and the voting public, for any 
politically motivated appointments to the bench. 
61 In contrast, a Judicial 
Appointments Commission could not be held accountable in the same manner
62 
The matter of accountability is discussed in the Ministry of Justice discussion 
paper on the possibility of a Judicial Appointments Commission in New Zealand. 
It states that63 
The proposed commission for England and Wales will be required to present an annual 
report to the Minister, who must prese nt it to both Houses of Parliament. As well, the 
commission's annual accounts must be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-
General , and this report presented by the Minister to Parliament. 
58 Sir Thomas Eichelbaum, above 11 13, 90. 
59 David Williams QC, above n 3, 63. 
60 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above 11 28, 42. 
61 David Williams QC, above n 3, 63. 
62 Department for Constitutional Affairs, above n 53, para 38. 
63 Ministry of Justice, above n 2, 28. 
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Clearly, such a system is focused on the financial accountability of the entity and 
provides little in the way of accountability for actual appointments. The 
assumption appears to be that once the executive is removed from the process it 
can no longer be subjected to political interference. This, as we shall see later, is 
a dangerous assumption. 
The typical response to the accountability critique is to promote a Commission 
based on the recommending model. The UK Consultation Paper states that
64 
While retaining mini sterial involvement and accountability, this model would 
significantly curtail that involvement by placing the entire appointments process in the 
hands of the Commission. However, the Minister would still remain ultimately 
accountable to Parliament for the appointments process. This model therefore 
preserves the con titutio nal convention that The Queen acts on the advice of Her 
ministers and also retains formal accountability to Parliament for the appointment of 
judges, a central funct ion of the state. 
While this argument is attractive in theory. the Attorney-General is unlikely to 
remain "ultimately accountable to Parliamen t" in practice. 
If the Attorney-General is no longer responsible for the appointment process, 
they are unlikely to be held accountable to Parliament for appointments made on 
the basis of that process. As Sir Geoffrey Palmer has noted 
Should the Attorney be restricted to the names put forward by the Commission or 
Board, he or she is not going to feel much responsibility or accountability. Nor will it 
have to be shouldered. Explanations to Parliament, the public and elsewhere will be 
that the only power of choice the Ano rney had was to choose between names 
advanced. Ministerial responsibility wi ll be effectively subverted for judicial 
appointments. 
Therefore, the introduction of a Judi cia l Appointments Committee, whether 
appointing or recommending, would destroy the inherent set of political checks 
64 Department for Constitutional Affairs, above n 53, para 48. 
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and balances in the current system. In addition, there is no guarantee that the 
Commission itself would be free from political interference. 
3 The potential poli1icisation of th e Commission 
It is submitted by critics of the cutTent process that the appointment of judges is 
at risk of becoming a political exercise. lf this is accepted then the appointment 
of a Judicial Appointments Commission 's members could itself become a highly 
political exercise.65 
Several members of the Commission (e.g. the Chief Justice) are appointed on the 
basis of their position within the legal community. However, it is also likely that 
several members, particularly members of the legal profession and any lay people 
appointed under the supplemented legal establishment model, will have to be 
appointed by the executive and presumably by the Attorney-General. 
Given the role of the Commission, if the executive cannot be trusted to appoint 
judges in a non-partisan manner it is difficult to believe that the appointment of 
the Commission's membership would be carried out any more impartially. 
Therefore, if the present system is under threat from politicisation, the 
appointment of a Commission would mere ly ensure that any interference was one 
step removed. That is it would transfer that interference from the actual 
appointment of judges to the appointment of the Judicial Appointments 
Commission. 
C Summary of the Politicisation Arguments 
Our current appointment process has been criticised for failing to provide 
sufficient constitutional safeguards to prevent political interference in the 
appointment process. 
65 Ministry of Justice, above n 2 , 30 . 
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Those in favour of a Judicial Appointments Commission argue that it would 
heavily reduce or eliminate the role of the executive in the appointment process. 
Therefore, the executive would have little opportunity to interfere in the 
appointment process. However, there are several counter-arguments to this 
position. 
The first point to note 1s that the argument m favour of a Commission is 
dependent upon an acceptance that political interference is, or is likely to 
become, a feature of our cu1Tent system. Although recent developments have 
brought the executive and judiciary closer together there is little evidence to 
suggest that this has produced, or is likely to produce, a politicised judiciary. 
In addition, the introduction of a Commission would remove the checks and 
balances inherent to the cu1Tent process. A Judicial Appointments Commission, 
whether appointing or recommending. could not be held accountable to 
Parliament, or the voting public. And ne ither would an Attorney-General acting 
on the advice of that Commission. 
Finally, there is also a risk that appointments to the Commission would 
themselves become highly political, and could enable political patronage. 
II QUALITY OF APPOINTMENTS 
A second common criticism of our current appointment system is that it suffers 
from serious process problems and, as suc h, fails to appoint the most meritorious 
candidates to the bench. 
The reasons for this are threefold. First there is a lack of information available on 
prospective candidates. Second there is a lack of coherence in the current 
process, and finally, the process itself is under-resourced. 
Again, it is necessary to consider whether the establishment of an Appointments 
Commission would serve to rectify these problems. 
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A The Argument in Favour of a Judicial Commission 
I Information 
The creation of a Judicial Appointments Commission would not, in itself, make 
up for the lack of a systematic database on prospective candidates. However, it 
would highlight the need for such an initi ative and so a database may well be the 
indirect result of establishing a Commiss ion. 
2 Coherence 
Currently the appointment process is administered by the Judicial Appointments 
Unit in the Ministry of Justice whil e the appointments themselves are made by 
the Attorney-General. Therefore, as the Minister of Justice and Attorney are not 
necessarily the same person, the Minster responsible for the Judicial 
Appointments Unit may well be different from the Minister to whom the Unit 
provides its substantive recommendations.
66 
The introduction of an independent Judi cial Appointments Commission would 
bring together in one place all of the work to support all judicial appointments 
and ensure a single person was responsibl e for the oversight of the process.
67 
3 Resources 
In order for any appointment process to function successfully it must have 
sufficient funding. It is arguable that the Judicial Appointments Unit is not well 
placed to lobby for fundin g as it is currentl y subsumed by the Ministry of Justice. 
In contrast, an independent Judicial Appointments Commission would be well 
placed to lobby the Government direc tl y for funding and would not have to 
compete with other departm nts within the Ministry of Justice. 
66 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above n 28, 47 . 
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B The Argument Against a Judicial Commission 
In his report on judicial administration iss ues Sir Geoffrey Palmer concluded that 
the process problems associated with the current process could be rectified 
without the creation of a new independent agency.
68 
Instead he recommended the creation of a new Judicial Appointments Liaisons 
Office with some degree of independence as to its substantive responsibilities, 
but still accountable to a Chief Executive in the normal way.
69 
As the Office is not to be a new or independent entity it would be located in a 
core Government Department or Ministry. Given that the Ministry of Justice, for 
the reasons discussed earlier, is not a des irable location the two possible locations 
from a practical point of view are the Crown Law Office and the Department for 
Courts. 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer concluded that the Crown Law Office was the better 
choice.70 
Consultations showed virtually unanimo us opposition to the Department for Courts 
carrying out the functi on so far as the Judiciary and the Law Society were concerned, 
but there was widespread support for the Crown Law Office. Since the Solicitor-
General is a constitutional o fficer already involved with higher judicial appointments, 
and with responsibilit y for aspects or the Government's relationship with the Judiciary, 
location in the Crown Law Oflice, o r ll'hich the Solicitor-General is the administrative 
head, is constitutionally appropriate and, in our view, clearly the most desirable option. 
The report also recommended that the Judicial Appointments and Liaisons Office 
be headed by a Deputy Solicitor-General. This would ensure that the Solicitor-
General was not burdened by the detail of the work while making sure that the 
67 Chen Palmer and Partners, above n 32, 14. 
68 Chen Palmer and Partners, above n 32, 15. 
69 Chen Palmer and Partners, above 11 32, 16. 
7° Chen Palmer and Partners, above n 32, 17 . 
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Office was still responsibl e to the Solicitor-General as the Chief Executive of the 
Crown Law Office. 
1 Coherence 
Placement within the Crown Law Office would be an effective solution to the 
coherence problems associated with the current process. The Judicial 
Appointments and Liai sons Office would report to the Solicitor-General as its 
Chief Executive and the Attorney-General as the responsible Minister. Therefore, 
the Minister receiving the recommendations would also be the Minister 
responsible for the Office, avoiding the di vision of responsibility between the 
Minster of Justice and the Attorney-General that can occur under the present 
system. 
2 Resources 
Also, as a semi-independent entity headed by a largely autonomous Deputy 
Solicitor-General the Office would have many of the same resourcing benefits 
associated with a Judicial Appointments Commission. I.e. it could be set up in 
such a manner that it lobbied for, and received, Government funding directly 
rather than through the Crown Law Office. 
3 Information 
Much like the Judicial Appointments Commission, the creation of a Judicial 
Appointments Office within the Crown Law Office would not, in itself, make up 
for the lack of a systematic database on prospective candidates. However, it too 
would highlight the need fo r such a system and could well provide the necessary 
impetus for the creation of such a sys tem. 
Therefore, the creation of a Judicial Appointments and Liaisons Office within the 
Crown Law Office would be as effec ti ve as the creation of a new independent 
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agency in remedying the process problems inherent to the current system. Indeed 
a new agency may well be a less efficient and less cost effective option. 
4 The advantages of a Judicial Appointments and Liaisons Office 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer's report notes three factors that suggest the introduction of a 
new agency would be a less desirable solution to the process problems. 
Firstly, a new agency would require new overheads, including management and 
governance. Secondly, it would spread the limited critical mass in the justice 
sector even further, and it would increase rather than decrease the transaction 
costs of consultation.
71 
The other clear advantage of Sir Geoffrey Palmer's proposal is that it would 
maintain the political chec ks and balances of the current system. As noted above, 
the Attorney-General would no longer be responsible to Parliament, or the voting 
public, for appointments made pursuant to the recommendations of an 
independent agency. However, under the Crown Law Office proposal the 
Attorney-General is the Minister responsible for the Judicial Appointments and 
Liaisons Office as well as the appointments themselves. As such he would be 
politically accountable to Parliament for both the recommendations of his office 
and the appointments he has made. 
Therefore, a Judicial Appointments Office within the Crown Law Office would 
be a more efficient, and more cost-effective solution to the existing process 
problems. In addition, it would maintain the political checks and balances that a 
Judicial Appointments Commission woul d destroy. 
7 1 Chen Palmer and Partners, ahove n 32, 15 . 
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C Summary of the Process Arguments 
Proponents of a Judicial Appointments Commission argue that its creation would 
help alleviate the process problems that prevent the current system from 
appointing the most meritorious candidates to the bench. 
The creation of a Commi ss ion would provide greater coherence within the 
system by ensuring the entire process was carried out within the new agency. It is 
also true that an independent agency would be better placed to lobby Parliament 
for the funding necessary to caJTy out its functions in a manner that ensures the 
best candidates are appointed to the bench. Finally, the creation of a Commission 
would also highlight the need for a systematic database on prospective candidates 
and could well result in the creation of such a system. 
However, a strong argument against the Commission can be made on the basis 
that a better solution to the process problems is available, namely the creation of 
a Judicial Appointments and Liaisons Office within the Crown Law Office. The 
Office would provide greater coherence by ensuring the Minster who appoints 
judges is also responsibl e for the Office who recommends those appointments. 
Also, the proposed Office would be semi-autonomous and headed by a deputy 
Solicitor-General which would place it in a better position to apply for funding 
than the current Judicial Appointments Unit. In addition, the creation of a new 
Office responsible for Judi cial Appointments would provide a similar impetus for 
the creation of a systematic database to that created by the formation of a Judicial 
Appointments Commission. 
The Crown Law Office proposal al so has a number of advantages when 
compared to the creation of a new agency. It is a more efficient and cost-effective 
proposal and, as the Attorney-General is the Minister responsible for the Office, 
the political checks and balances of the current appointment system are 
maintained. 
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III PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN Tl-IE JUDICIARY 
Finally, the current appointment process has been criticised for failing to 
engender the requisite public confidence in those it appoints. 
These criticisms may be split into two broad categories. The failure to appoint a 
representative judiciary, and the lack of transparency in the appointment process. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether the creation of an independent 
Commission would help all eviate either criticism . 
A The Lack of a Representative Judiciary 
1 A representative bench 
It has been strongly argued that the adoption of a Judicial Appointments 
Commission would actuall y lead to a more conservative and less representative 
bench than under the current system. Fo1mer Attorney-General , the Hon Paul 
East noted that
72 
In recent months there has been so me n iti cism o f the manner in which we appoint our 
Judges. There have been sugges ti ons put forward that there should be some form of 
judicial commiss ion to undertake thi s ro le. For my part, I think there are some 
problems with such a proposa l. Inev it ab ly, the judicial commission wo uld be made up 
of a number of judges. Wh y should it be sitting judges who sho uld determine who has 
qualified to join their ranks? I agree th at any reapprai sal o f the judicial system should 
include a willingness 10 loo k at the poo l o f lawyers fro m which we pick our judges. My 
hesitation is that a judi cial co mmi ssion is more like ly to continue to pick from the 
traditional pool rather than to stri ve to ensure the judiciary is representative of the 
whole cross section of soc iety. 
These concerns have been echoed by Sir Geoffrey Palmer. He adds that the likely 
result of a Judicial Appoimments Commiss ion is to transform the judiciary into a 
72 Hon Paul East, Attorney-Ge neral , Speech Notes f'o r Address to Lawlink Co nference, 19 Ma
rch 
1993, 8-9. 
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self-perpetuating oligarchy where future appointments would be dictated by the 
existing white, male, middle-class bench. 
73 The suggestion is that such a 
Commission would be overly cautious, with a tendency towards safe 
appointments and blandness.
74 
The obvious response to this argument is a Commission based on the 
supplemented legal establishment mode l. The inclusion of lay people on the 
Commission would be expected to prevent the judiciary from transforming into, 
or being perceived as, a self-perpetuating oligarchy as well as ensuring a more 
representative bench. However, there are serious difficulties with this proposal. 
The primary problem with the supplemented legal establishment model is that the 
lay representatives are unlike ly to possess detailed legal knowledge. As such they 
are also unlikely to exert much influence over those on the Commission who are 
members of the legal profess ion . Sir Geoffrey Palmer has noted that
75 
Obviously, a judicia l commissio n could be constructed which had no representation of 
Judges or minimal representation, but then it would have to consult the Judges. 
Furthermore, in my experience Judges are anxious to exert influence on appointments. 
It is clearly right that they sho uld be properly consulted. It is not right that they should 
drive the process and I believe they would under most variations of the Judicial 
Commission proposa l, even if" it appeared they did not. If Judges are in the Commission 
they will exert great weight on the opinion of lay members. 
This view, that any lay members are likely to be ineffective, was also recognised 
by the 1978 Report of the Royal Commission on the Courts which first proposed 
the formation of a Judicial Commission in New Zealand. That report conceded 
that it was "troubled"76 by the iss ue of non-representation on the Appointments 
Committee by non-lawyers but ultimate ly concluded that lay persons could not 
really contribute to the appointment process because they would not possess any 
real knowledge of the skills and qualities of potential appointees. Accordingly the 
73 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above 11 28, 82. 
74 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above 11 28, 81. 
75 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above 11 28, 8 1-82. 
76 Report of the Royal Co111111issio11 011 the Courts, above n 12,202. 
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Royal Commission took the view that " the idea of involving laymen ... may be no 
more than an attempt to meet fashionable demand".
77 
2 ls the appointment system to blame for the absence of a representative 
bench? 
It is also worth noting that it is far from clear that the current appointment system 
is responsible for the lack of a representative bench. 
In his article, The Judicial Appointment Process, David Williams QC argues 
strongly that merit, and not a representative judiciary must be the basis for all 
judicial appointments. While Mr Williams acknowledges that the appointment of 
judges of differing genders and ethnic backgrounds can enrich a court, he 
believes that it is 78 
necessary to stress the danger and the temptation of allowing diversity to permit only 
moderately qualified candidates to be selected ahead of much better qualified 
candidates in terms o r practical experience in the law and intellectual and analytical 
ability. In other words, merit , de fin ed primarily as intellectual and analytical ability 
accompanied by the necessary qualities o f character, should always remain the final 
determining factor for appo intments to the Bench, and the best qualified candidate 
should be selected irrespec ti ve of the ir gender, cultural or social background. 
Therefore, Mr Williams concludes that diversity must never displace merit when 
determining the most appropriate appointments. The only time diversity should 
be considered is where there is a choice between a number of equally well-
qualified candidates. In that case, to give preference to, say, a woman ts 
justifiable in the public interes t and as a long-term benefit to the court.
79 
Therefore, the current appointment system cannot be blamed for the lack of a 
representative bench if it is due to a lack of qualified candidates from certain 
sections of society. As Attorney-General, Sir Geoffrey Palmer found that he 
77 Report of the Royal Com111issio11 011 rhe Courrs, above n 12 , 202. 
78 David Williams QC, above 11 3, 51. 
79 David Williams QC, above 11 3, 51. 
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spent a lot of time searching for qualifi ed women and Maori to become Judges and 
found that the number o f peo ple at that time with the re levant experience were few. [He 
was] confident that the situati on [ would] improve in relation to women as their 
numbers in the lega l profession continue to climb. So it [would] be with Maori . 
Therefore, it is arguable that the current bench merely reflects the fact that the 
profession is dominated by white males. They are therefore likely to produce the 
more meritorious candidates who should be, and are, appointed under the current 
system. Therefore, the key to a more representative bench may not be a change to 
the appointment system but to encourage a wider cross-section of society to enter 
the profession in the first place. 
B The Lack of Transparency 
1 Would a Commission improve transparency? 
While the current system has been critici sed for a lack of transparency, it is far 
from clear that the creation of a Judici al Appointments Commission would, in 
itself, improve transparency. 
As John McGrath QC, Soli citor-Genera l has noted80 
Various models fo r reform offer greater or lesser transparency. But much can also be 
achieved to improve transparency witho ut great change to the present appointment 
model. 
Therefore, while a Judicial Appointments Commission could be created in a 
manner that improves transparency by, fo r example, making public the process 
by which the Attorney-General forms a short-list and makes appointments, the 
same measures could equall y be applied to the current system without the 
creation of an entirely new agency. Thi s is because public scrutiny is not linked 
80 John McGrath QC, above n 37, 3 16. 
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to the structure of an appointment system but to the level of disclosure within that 
system. 
2 ls transparency necessarily a good thing? 
It is also important to note that an argument can be made that too much 
transparency in the process could be detrimental to the quality of appointments. 
Most High Court judges in New Zealand would accept appointments at a 
considerable financial cost to themselves. The strong sense of duty that may 
motivate acceptance of an offer of appointment may be undermined if the 
candidate believes his or her suitability may undergo severe public scrutiny.
81 In 
addition, the potential damage to the reputation of a failed candidate whose 
application was in the public sphere could also discourage potential candidates 
from putting their names forward. Therefore, an increase in transparency could 
discourage quality candidates from applying, or accepting, a position on the 
bench. This would decrease the quality of appointments made by either the 
current process or a Judici al Appointments Commission. 
C Summary of Public Confidence Arguments 
Critics of the current system have argued that it fails to engender the necessary 
public confidence in our judiciary. This is because the process has not produced a 
representative judiciary and because the process is largely shrouded in secrecy. 
However, it is far from clear that the creation of a Judicial Appointments 
Commission is the answer to thcs problems. 
Indeed, the creation of such a Commission is likely to result in a more 
conservative bench as the ex isting white, male, middle class bench would 
dominate the Commission and its appointments. The appointment of lay people 
to the Commission is unlike ly to prevent the creation of this self-perpetuating 
81 P J Butler "The Office of Hi gh Court Judge" LLM Research Paper: Legal Profession and the 
Law (1994) 11. 
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oligarchy as they are unlikely to possess the specialised skills required to prevent 
members of the legal profession from dominating proceedings. 
Also, the existence of a non-representative judiciary is not necessarily a product 
of the current appointment system. Merit must always be the primary criteria for 
appointments with diversity used only in tie-breaker situations. Therefore, the 
lack of diversity on the bench is perhaps more of a reflection of a lack of 
diversity within the legal profession as a whole, rather than of a conservative 
appointment process. As the number of women, Maori and other ethnic groups 
entering the profession increase, so too should their representation on the bench. 
The creation of a Judicial Appointments Commission, in itself, is also unlikely to 
improve transparency in the system. Any steps taken to increase transparency 
within the Commission could equally be applied to the existing process without 
the creation of a new agency. 
Finally, it should be noted that too much transparency in the appointments system 
could decrease the quality of appointments. The prospect of public scrutiny of a 
candidate's suitability and the possibility of a public failure to be appointed at all 
may discourage meritorious candidates from accepting a position on the bench or 
from applying in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper identifies three key criteria which are the hallmarks of any successful 
appointment system. Those criteria are political neutrality, quality of appointment 
and the maintenance of public confidence in the judiciary. 
Our current appointment process has been criticised for failures in relation to 
each of these key criteria. However, while there are a number of concerns with 
the current appointment system, the creation of a Judicial Appointments 
Commission would not result in a system that better satisfies those key criteria. 
38 
Firstly, the current system has been criticised for a lack of constitutional 
safeguards that would prevent the influence of political favouritism in the 
appointment process . At present the system is protected solely by a convention 
that judges are not appointed for politi cal purposes . While the system has, in 
general, not been abused, a number of recent developments have increased the 
risk of political interference. 
The primary development has been the growth of judicial review proceedings 
which have increasingly placed the courts closer to the executive in terms of 
policy and decision making. This incursion by the courts into areas that have 
traditionally been the sole preserve of the executive has increased the potential 
for politically motivated appointments. Also, the development of Treaty of 
Waitangi jurisprudence, the Bill of Rights Act and more generalised legislation 
have increased judicial activity in areas generally reserved for the executive. 
The argument in favour of a Judicial Appointments Commission is that it would 
heavily reduce, or eliminate, exec utive involvement in the appointment process. 
This would reduce the opportunity for political interference in the appointment of 
the judiciary. 
However, the creation of a Judicial Appointments Commission would also 
destroy the political checks and balances inherent to the current process. An 
Appointments Commission could not be held accountable to Parliament, or the 
voting public, for its appointments, and neither would an Attorney-General for 
merely acting on the advice of the Commission. There is also a real risk that 
appointments to the Commission would themselves become highly political. 
Secondly, a number of process problems have been identified with the current 
system that could prevent the most meritorious candidates from being appointed 
to the bench. The primary criticism is the lack of an adequate systematic database 
on potential candidates. In the absence of sufficient information it is difficult to 
ensure that the most appropriate candidates will always be appointed. In addition, 
important process functi ons such as short-listing and interviewing have fallen 
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short of best practices for two reasons. Firstly, because the Minister of Justice 
and the Attorney-General are not always the same person, a lack of coherence 
arises where the Judicial Appointments Unit reports to the Minister of Justice but 
makes recommendations to the Attorney. Secondly, an under-resourced Judicial 
Appointments Unit has also been identified as a source of the process problems. 
Proponents of a Judicial Appointments Commission argue that it would alleviate 
the current process problems by introducing greater coherence and by being 
better placed to lobby Parliament for funding. 
The creation of an Appointments Commission would create greater coherence as 
the entire appointing process would be carried out within the new agency. In 
addition, as an independent agency they would be better placed to lobby directly 
for funding than the Judicial Appointments Unit as a division of the Ministry of 
Justice. 
However, it is not true to say that the creation of a new and independent agency is 
the best way to remedy the current process problems. Those problems could be 
dealt with equally well by the establishment of a Judicial Appointments and 
Liaisons Office within the Crown Law Office. As the Attorney-General is the 
Minister responsible for the Crown Law Office, judicial appointments would be 
made by the Minister responsible for the Office that makes the recommendations. 
Therefore, the coherence problems associated with recommendations made by 
the Ministry of Justice would be avoided and, as a semi-autonomous branch of 
Crown Law run by a Deputy Solicitor-General, it could lobby Parliament directly 
for funding rather than depending on the Crown Law Office to secure the 
necessary funding. 
In addition, the Crown Law Office proposal has a number of advantages over the 
Commission. It would be a more efficient and cost-effective solution, and the 
inherent political checks and balances within the cu,,-ent system would be 
maintained. 
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Finally, the current appointment process has been criticised for failing to 
maintain public confidence in the judiciary it appoints. These criticisms may be 
split into two categories, the failure to appoint a representative judiciary and a 
lack of transparency in the appointment process. 
It is argued that the work of judges involves the constant application of their 
perception of community sta ndards . If those judges, who are predominantly 
white, male and middle class, are not seen as representative of society the general 
public is less likely to believe those perceptions are reflective of society and this 
is unlikely to ensure public confidence in their decisions. 
By the same token, the current appointment process is largely shrouded from 
public scrutiny. Again , it is unlikely that the public will have absolute confidence 
in an institution, the make- up of wh ich they do not understand. 
However, the creation of a Judicial Appointments Commission does not appear 
to be the answer to these problems. Indeed, an Appointments Commission is 
more likely to result in an increas ingly conservative bench by transforming the 
judiciary into a self-perpetuating oligarchy. The addition of lay people to the 
Commission would not remedy the situation as they are unlikely to possess the 
specialised skills required to prevent members of the legal profession from 
dominating proceedings. 
Also, the current lack of diversi ty on the bench is not necessarily a product of the 
current appointment system. Past Attorney-Generals have had great difficulty in 
finding female, Maori or other ethn ic groups who were sufficiently qualified to 
be appointed to the bench. Therefore, the lack of divers ity on the bench perhaps 
reflects the lack of diversity within the legal profession as a whole rather than a 
conservative appointment process. 
The creation of a Judicial Appointments Commission , in itself, is also unlikely to 
improve transparency in the system. Any steps taken to increase transparency 
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within the Commission could equally be applied to the existing process without 
the creation of a new agency. 
Therefore, a number of problems exist with the current appointment process and 
some reform is probably required. However, the creation of a Judicial 
Appointments Commission is not the best means of addressing those problems. 
While it would alleviate a number of the existing concerns it would also create a 
host of new problems. Other opti ons exist for dealing with many of the existing 
problems, such as centralising the process within the Crown Law Office, and 
should be implemented to improve the current system without the creation of a 
new agency and a new set of problems . 
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